The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 41
Number 1 Parameters Spring 2011

Article 2

3-1-2011

Book Reviews
Parameters Editors

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters

Recommended Citation
Parameters Editors, "Book Reviews," Parameters 41, no. 1 (2011), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2564.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Book Reviews
Known and Unknown: A Memoir

Courtesy of Sentinel

by Donald Rumsfeld
Reviewed by Colonel Lloyd J. Matthews, USA,
Retired, former editor of Parameters, US Army War
College Quarterly

F

rom time immemorial, soldiers, politicians, officeholders, and other functionaries who ended their
careers
under a cloud of public opprobrium have seen
New York: Sentinel,
2011
fit on leaving office to write an “apologia”—not to be
confused with “apology,” an expression of regret over
815 pages
admitted failure. An apologia rather is a defense, usually
$36.00
based on detailed explanation, evidence, and argument,
of the author’s beclouded career. Perhaps the most famous instance was English
Cardinal John Henry Newman’s Apologia pro Vita sua (1864), which attempted
to vindicate his conversion late in life from the Church of England to Roman
Catholicism and which is now recalled as one of the greatest prose masterpieces
in the English language. Certainly no stigma attaches to writing an apologia.
Any public person whose actions and character have been broadly impugned
deserves the right to make a considered public reply.
An instance of such a reply inviting comparison with Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s Known and Unknown is former Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara’s In Retrospect (1995), in which he owned up to
his failure to divulge his growing reservations concerning the Vietnam war to
President Lyndon Johnson. Though McNamara’s book is nominally an apology,
it is clear that he was still nursing wounds from the savaging he endured at
the hands of Vietnam war critics and was hoping to rehabilitate his place in
history by portraying his war decisions in a more nuanced and sympathetic
light. Ironically, the appearance of his book some 30 years after the events
served little more than to awaken and re-vocalize his critics. I mention his book
to illustrate that authors can and do mix artful apology into their apologia as a
deliberate rhetorical technique. By admitting to venial mistakes, they hope to
gain credibility later in defending their whoppers.
In Rumsfeld’s apologia for his stewardship of the Pentagon during the
first six years of the George W. Bush administration, he elevates the device of
the self-serving admission of minor error into a high art form. One example of
many: “I soon learned that my ‘old Europe’ comment had touched a raw nerve.
It caused an uproar, especially from those who felt they were on the receiving
end of my remark. The French Finance Minister called the comment ‘deeply
irritating.’ Ironically, my comment was unintentional. I had meant to say France
and Germany represented ‘old NATO,’ not ‘old Europe.’”
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The title page of Rumsfeld’s lengthy apologia (16 pages of front matter
plus 815 pages of text and back matter) contains no mention of coauthors or
a ghost writer. On the reverse, the publisher Penguin (Sentinel is part of the
Penguin Group) states that “the story, the experiences, and the words are the
author’s alone.” On page xv, Rumsfeld speaks of the novel experience of writing
a book: “I had never tried to do so before.” However, tucked away on pages 727
through 730 are acknowledgements containing by my count 130 named individuals excluding family, plus several library, archival, and institutional staffs.
It becomes immediately clear on reading Rumsfeld’s description of the book’s
production (“four years in the making”) that it is in fact a massive collaborative
artifact put together by a high-powered team of writers, editors, researchers,
fact-checkers, consultants, and advisors under Rumsfeld’s direction. The team
invites comparison to military staff, as well it might: “The core group was
headed by Keith Urbahn, my chief of staff and a Navy reserve intelligence
officer, who has taken on historical, creative, and managerial responsibilities
well beyond his years. . . .” As a longtime observer of the writing and production of books, I was astonished that Mr. Rumsfeld, having left office and no
longer enjoying official entree to Department of Defense resources, was able
to mobilize such a huge administrative, logistical, and creative effort. A clue
resides in a note appearing in Army Times: “Rumsfeld received ‘big bids’ for
his book, according to a publishing official who asked not to be identified, but
decided to accept no advance for his book, only money for expenses. Any profit
[after expenses] will be donated to a foundation he established recently to fund
such projects as grants for ‘promising young individuals’ interested in public
service” (28 April 2008, pp. 4-5).
Rumsfeld’s story actually covers his entire 50-plus-year professional
career, an illustrious career by any standard, but most readers, including this
reviewer, will focus on his second stint as Secretary of Defense, lasting from
20 January 2001 to 15 December 2006, under President George W. Bush. This
period embraced both the Afghanistan war (Operation Enduring Freedom) commencing 7 October 2001, and the second Iraq war (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
commencing 19 March 2003. The book has a big woolly thesis, roughly compressible as follows: Operation Iraqi Freedom, launched by President George
W. Bush on 20 March 2003, to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq
and destroy his supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), was justified,
even if no WMD were found; moreover, the Department of Defense’s planning for and execution of the war had been generally sound, despite the war’s
unexpected prolongation and despite serious blunders by the Department of
State, Coalition Provisional Authority, intelligence community, news media,
National Security Council, Congress, and even the President. In purely formal
terms, that is, as a display of argumentative adeptness, Mr. Rumsfeld’s defense
of this thesis is extremely impressive. The case is meticulously conceived,
exhaustively executed, massively documented (Rumsfeld appears never to have
discarded a written thought or utterance), and, above all, shrewdly anticipative
in foreseeing objections by gainsayers and then preempting them.
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Unsympathetic readers who hope to find new verbal tokens of such
disagreeable and widely alleged Rumsfeldian personality traits as arrogance,
abrasiveness, raw egotism, and cocksureness, may be disappointed. The
Rumsfeld persona appearing here has undergone an extreme makeover: generally, he is sunny, understanding, forbearing, receptive to subordinates’ bad
news and disagreements, and generally sparing of others’ feelings—though
he pulls few punches in expressing disappointment with Condoleeza Rice, L.
Paul Bremer, Colin Powell, and George Tenet. Moreover, on big policy issues,
many readers will believe Rumsfeld was substantially correct on most of them
(for example, on our detainee program at Guantanamo, which despite unprecedented criticism has now been essentially adopted by the next administration).
But regardless of whether one agrees with the thrust of the book or
believes it was successful in its purpose, it seems undeniable that it makes an
essential contribution to the chronicle of our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. US
defense policy in those nations since the terrorist attacks on American soil on
11 September 2001, has been subject to unrelenting criticism in the nation’s
press, popular commentary, and contemporary histories—e.g., George Packer,
The Assassin’s Gate (2005); Thomas Ricks, Fiasco (2006); Bob Woodward,
State of Denial (2006) and The War Within (2008); Michael Gordon and
Bernard Trainor, Cobra II (2006); Charles Ferguson, No End in Sight (2008);
and especially Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes,
and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (2009). This onslaught has not been
successfully counterbalanced by President George W. Bush’s own memoir
Decision Points (2010); Douglas Feith’s memoir War and Decision (2008); or
L. Paul Bremer’s mixed and narrowly focused My Year in Iraq (2005). Certainly
future historians, if not today’s, need to hear the best case each side has to offer,
and Rumsfeld’s is far and away the most cogent defense of US policy—and of
himself as a major architect of that policy—that we are likely to get.
Let us now return to the subject of Mr. Rumsfeld’s “whoppers” alluded
to earlier, that is, instances in which he steadfastly refused to admit big mistakes.
Two examples. The first is a leadership issue, namely, his shoddy treatment
of General Eric Shinseki, the Army’s Chief of Staff and an officer of impeccable character who had his lower leg blown off in Vietnam but continued to
serve, and who today in retirement leads the Veterans Administration. General
Shinseki ran seriously afoul of the Secretary during the latter part of his tenure
as Chief of Staff. A prime instance was his refusal to support cancellation of the
Crusader artillery system in the spring 2002 Pentagon review process culminating in Mr. Rumsfeld’s cancellation decision announced finally on 8 May. It so
happened that during this contentious period, April 2002, well over a year prior
to Genearl Shinseki’s scheduled retirement in June 2003, word surfaced in the
Pentagon that Shinseki’s replacement, when the time came, would be his deputy
General Jack Keane (who later declined). Since in the Pentagon bureaucracy
power tends to shift rather rapidly from the incumbent to the named successor, the effect was to lame duck, and thus to rebuke and humiliate, the sitting
chief. Rumsfeld was roundly attacked in the press for what was apparently a
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maliciously retaliatory stroke against General Shinseki, and in the present book
he takes the witness stand to defend himself (pp. 452-56, 650-54). It is a long,
complicated, and even convoluted defense in which he disclaims any intention
of lame ducking Shinseki (he does not broach that word). In denying that he
was the leaker or arranged the leak, he begs the issue entirely. Why would
he even be discussing a successor with Pentagon principals 14 to 15 months
before the event? Moreover, from all he says, it is impossible to establish a
precise timeline for events, and, most telling, he carefully avoids spelling out
the unprecedented long lapse of time between his discussion of a successor
and the actual date of Shinseki’s scheduled retirement. After poring over his
explanation several times and consulting other sources (Thomas Ricks, Fiasco,
p. 69; Robert Novak, Washington Post, 1 May 2003; Frank Tiboni, Army Times,
12 June 2003; and Richard Kohn, Armed Forces Journal, June 2006), this
reviewer concludes that Mr. Rumsfeld’s lengthy protest is disingenuous.
The second whopper is a policy issue. Philosophically speaking,
Mr. Rumsfeld was a ground-power minimalist and remained one to the day
he departed his position. Early on, he had become enamored of “net-centric
warfare,” the theory being to integrate all actors within a common grid composed
of communications, computers, sensors, and other inputs so as to universalize
the flow of information. Information superiority, reinforced by technological
superiority in weaponry, target acquisition, and delivery platforms, enables
faster decision cycles, forestalls enemy reactions, creates more friendly
options, and minimizes risks and casualties. Capitalizing on precision-guided
munitions of devastating power and launched at safe standoff distances and
altitudes, network-centric violence is visited upon the enemy from the hygienic
confines of hermetically sealed cockpits and missile-launch control rooms. No
more need for big numbers of expensive ground troops to bend the enemy to
our will. No more discomfiting casualty figures assailing the eyes of voters with
each evening’s news telecast. After all those bloody wars since Homeric times,
we had finally discovered a way to win them on the cheap! Or so one would
believe from all the hype generated by DOD’s Office of Force Transformation
beginning in late 2001. Mr. Rumsfeld could never quite entertain the thought
that net-centric warfare as fleshed out with its full armamentarium of gee-whiz
stand-off weaponry was operationally and strategically impotent in a likely
insurgency war where securing the population and providing fit governance
were key.
The Weinberger/Powell doctrine had wisely counselled that no future
US military intervention be undertaken without decisive force. Yet, Mr.
Rumsfeld, casting aside such stodgy old thinking, arranged for Operation Iraqi
Freedom to be conducted on a shoestring (even if we include the 4th Infantry
Division, which was barred by Turkey from invading Iraq from its soil). We
succeeded brilliantly in the initial assault against Saddam’s frontline forces, but
were never able to muster the sort of widespread, smothering troop presence
that would have snuffed out all significant opposition from the start. Despite the
Weinberger/Powell insistence on clear political objectives, Rumsfeld’s priority
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was to achieve a quick military victory and get out. He devoted little attention to
such politico-strategic concerns as post-conflict consolidation and government
reconstitution, which would require large numbers of troops on the ground.
Mr. Rumsfeld never seemed willing to include in his definition of victory in
war the coequally valid desideratum of an acceptable peace. He never seemed
to grasp that war is always fought for political ends and that overriding efforts
must therefore be devoted to assuring that the desired political ends materialize.
This idea is as old as Clausewitz, of course, and we may note that since the
inauguration of the most recent Clausewitzian renaissance by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret in 1976, the nation’s political and military leaders have been
literally drenched in reminders of the great philosopher’s enduring dictum. Yet,
in an irony bordering on the surreal, we as a nation have continued to celebrate
the heroics and drama of the battlefield while political rewards remain tantalizingly beyond reach. It is incredible that Mr. Rumsfeld and his coterie did not
know this or chose to ignore it. Prior to the war the “Future of Iraq Project” was
completed by the Department of State which presciently warned of the sectarian furies that would be unleashed with the Iraqi government’s decapitation
and the consequent requirement for the wherewithal to establish and maintain
order, security, and a functioning government in the war’s immediate aftermath.
Rumsfeld was later criticized for ignoring this “plan.”
In his book, Rumsfeld grows testy on the issue, defending himself
as follows: “The notion that a few in the State Department may have alerted
people to potential problems in postwar Iraq—even if quite helpfully—was
not on its face a seminal achievement. I had listed problems that might arise in
postwar Iraq in my ‘Parade of Horribles’ memo. That does not mean my memo
was a plan or solution” (p. 486). By shifting the question to the definitional
issue of whether the State document was a “plan,” Mr. Rumsfeld ignores the
essential point that he had been well warned about what would happen if we
barged into Iraq lacking sufficient troops to establish and maintain order as a
necessary prelude to establishing a viable government. In fact, growing exasperated over the drumbeat of such warning, Mr. Rumsfeld, according to retired
Major General John Batiste, “at one point threatened to fire the next person
who mentioned the need for a postwar plan in Iraq.” As a result, we ad hoced
it with what few troops we had and could scrounge, the insurgency grew and
then snowballed, and we are still there eight years later. At each step of the
way, his has been the reluctant, skeptical, or naysayer’s voice against calls for
troop increases, citing a general here or there in support, worrying about an
overly large US “footprint,” fretting over the undeniable stress on the force and
families (all legitimate concerns but not valid reasons for accepting defeat), or
assuring listeners that commanders had not asked for more troops (they knew
what the answer would be).
A dynamic soon emerged, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which we
with great fanfare cleared a city of al Qaeda, then departed and used the same
troops to clear another city, only to see the first revert to al Qaeda’s control
once our troops pulled out. Senator John McCain accurately characterized
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this pattern as “playing an endless game of whack-a-mole.” We simply didn’t
have enough forces to clear, hold, pacify, and consolidate, nor were sufficient
numbers of capable indigenous Iraqi police/soldiers available to take over
cleared cities and protect the population once American troops pulled out to
go whack the next mole. It is of course true that raising additional troops for
an already stretched volunteer Army was no easy task, and it is understandable
that Rumsfeld was reluctant to put the President on the spot by asking for
more. But it was maddeningly perverse for him to pretend publicly that more
troops were not needed or that, if they were, they could be squeezed out of
headquarters and other nondeployed stateside administrative units by resorting
to greater “efficiencies.”
It is significant that the book’s otherwise complete and detailed index
contains no mention whatever of the celebrated 2007 surge—at least I couldn’t
find it—since the successful surge, requiring an additional 20,000 troops, spectacularly revealed the utter bankruptcy of Rumsfeld’s “strategy” for winning
the war on the cheap, including his pretense right up to the bitter end that
additional troops would serve no useful purpose, even though control of the
capital Baghdad, among other embarrassments, had been essentially ceded to
thugs, death squads, sectarian militias, and the ever-present al Qaeda. Omission
from the book index of this topic can be technically justified by the fact that
Rumsfeld resigned on 6 November 2006 (the date of his letter of resignation
but he did not actually leave the Department until 15 December), whereas the
new military commander General David Petraeus was not nominated to implement the surge until 26 January 2007, over two months after Rumsfeld left
office. But Rumsfeld was privy to early discussions of the surge in November
and indeed treats the subject in some depth (pp. 713-17) in his final chapter.
Thus, the omission of the topic from the index will raise eyebrows, particularly
since the rest of the chapter is indexed.
His remarks on the surge are lukewarm at best and misleading at worst,
couched in terms suggesting he was won to the idea only as the objective
conditions favoring it gradually became propitious. First, in November 2006:
“Since a surge of military forces still lacked support among military leaders,
that suggestion was placed in my memo [on options] ‘below the line’—in other
words, as a less favored option.” Subsequently, after President Bush had firmly
demanded of his advisors a plan for winning the war, not for pulling up stakes,
and had approved General Petraeus’s request for 20,000 more troops which
began deploying in January 2007: “Though I was a latecomer in supporting the
surge, by the time I left the Pentagon I felt there were solid arguments for its two
main military features: a somewhat heavier US footprint [he can’t bring himself
to say “more troops”] and a new operational approach that centered on securing
the population” [he fails to mention that it took four years for him to admit the
virtue of this approach]. At the time of his departure from the Pentagon, he was
asked by a television reporter what he thought of the plan to send additional
soldiers to Iraq. His reply: “Well, one first has to inquire what they’ll be used
for,” or words to that effect. During the Fox Evening News on 23 November
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2008, the crawler reported Rumsfeld’s statement that the 2007 surge in Iraq
worked because, under him, all the groundwork had been laid, e.g., the Sunni
Awakening, etc., but that the surge would not have worked earlier.
As it related to Mr. Rumsfeld’s
effort to salvage his reputation, it was
unfortunate for him that the President
Rumsfeld was a latecomer
selected Robert Gates to succeed him.
in supporting the surge.
Their juxtaposition in office invited
attention to their contrasting managerial styles, and the contrast was not
flattering to Mr. Rumsfeld. Mr. Gates soon showed himself to be as smart
and tough as his predecessor, while his modesty, calm demeanor, and quiet
confidence reassured a doubtful public and garnered a welcome measure of
bipartisan support.
As noted, Mr. Rumsfeld confessed to many niggling missteps during his
second tour at the Pentagon, but to this reviewer the book disappoints because
he never stepped up to the plate and confessed to the biggest missteps of all—
failure to act on the elementary principle that before undertaking to decapitate
a government, one must be prepared to recapitate it; and, relatedly, failure to
acknowledge the troop-intensive nature of the resulting counterinsurgency war
in a sect- and tribal-riven failed state. Had he recognized these requirements,
and employed his vast energy and talents to meet them, the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars may well have been shortened, with far fewer American casualties.
At General Shinseki’s retirement ceremony, to which Mr. Rumsfeld
was not invited, the general warned his civilian masters against “trying to
execute a twelve-division strategy with a ten-division Army.” This must have
stung the Secretary when he read the press reports, not only because it was so
epigrammatically pointed but also because it was so devastatingly accurate.
Though the apologia Known and Unknown is indeed a prodigious
monument to human vanity, it remains an adroit case on behalf of the Pentagon
imperium of Donald Rumsfeld, a Secretary of Defense who, though not quite
larger than life, came about as close as life itself is likely to permit. The book is
a major contribution to the historiography professionals who aim to stay abreast
of the defense world at the top and they should definitely take a spin through
this provocative work.
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Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: Abd
al-Aziz al-Muqrin’s “A Practical Course for
Guerrilla War”
Courtesy of Potomac Books

by Norman Cigar
Reviewed by Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr.,
Professor of Military History, US Army War College

S

un Tzu is famous for his admonition to know your
enemy; this book is another step toward knowing
modern Islamist terrorists. Norman Cigar, a research
224 pages
fellow with a strong Arabic background, and former pro$55.00
fessor at the Marine Corps University, has translated and
($26.95 paper)
analyzed one of several extant texts intended as doctrine
for the jihadist movement. This one is by Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who was a
lifelong terrorist and briefly head of Al-Qa’ida of the Arabian Peninsula (QAP),
the branch organization for Al-Qa’ida in Saudi Arabia, until Saudi security
forces killed him in June 2004. Al-Muqrin wrote his text A Practical Course
for Guerrilla War as a training manual for his QAP forces. The book was published both in pamphlet form and serialized on QAP’s website. The impact of
the work on overall terrorist doctrine or the degree of authority attributed to
it is unknown, although it is still available in Arabic on various terrorist websites. This is the first English translation to be published. This reviewer cannot
comment on the quality of the translation, but Cigar’s extensive analysis (about
half of the book) is very well done.
A Practical Course for Guerrilla War is a very tactical manual. There
are long chapters on topics such as using dead drops for communications, how
to ambush a motorcade, and urban tactical procedures. Much of this is straight
out of western doctrinal manuals, which al-Muqrin leaned on heavily. For
example, he recommends clearing buildings from top to bottom and blowing
entry points rather than using doors or windows—standard procedures that
depend on both access to roofs of denied buildings and extensive supplies of
demolitions, which is always problematic for western armies and well outside
the capability of most guerrilla forces. He does not discuss why a guerrilla
would want to clear a building. Conversely, one sees glimpses of strategic
thought or passages that give strategic insight in several sections of the book.
Al-Muqrin starts his text with a definition of war, the objectives of war, and the
causes of war. He covers those subjects in about three-quarters of a page, but
that brief excursion gives a glimpse into how he thinks about war. For example,
al-Muqrin defines just war as war by an oppressed people against their oppressor. He defines unjust war as war waged “to dominate other belief systems, to
replace the prescriptions of religious laws, to seize territory, and to plunder
(other’s) riches.” That reflects his (and many other terrorists’) understanding of
the current conflict. When he gets into types of war and how to fight a guerrilla
war, al-Muqrin defaults directly to Maoist theory. He adopts Mao’s three phases
Washington:
Potomac Books,
2009
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of protracted war directly. He sees the countryside as the critical terrain. He
emphasizes gaining the support of the people, although he does not spend much
time discussing the subject since he seems to assume the people believe as he
does and will naturally support the
jihad once they see its importance.
Al-Muqrin believes conventional
al-Muqrin adopts Mao’s three
forces supported by guerrillas will
phases of protracted war.
win the final victory, which is not
part of standard jihadist literature.
This raises the issue of A Practical
Course for Guerrilla War’s place
in jihadist literature.
Al-Muqrin’s text is representative of its genre; however, it differs
from other terrorist doctrine in several respects. For example, the introductory
remarks are full of the obligatory religious obeisance, but the body of the text
is much more sectarian than most jihadist works. This reflects its purpose as
a military manual rather than a political text, which would be more religious
in nature. Similarly, this text is written in the context of QAP and with that
very specific environment in mind. Thus, Cigar finds it unusual that al-Muqrin
does not discuss weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but that is perfectly
understandable since a devout Muslim would be reluctant to use WMD in Saudi
Arabia even if he thinks the government is apostate. The Arabian Peninsula
perspective also makes the reliance on Maoist theory understandable since alMuqrin wrote as a nationalist insurgent, not as a terrorist with international
pretentions. More puzzling is the lack of mention of improvised explosive
devices or suicide bombers, both major elements of jihadist tactics that have
been used in Saudi Arabia, perhaps reflecting experience with the negative
impact of collateral damage on public opinion. The most interesting aspect
of this work is how much it reflects traditional military theory; strategically,
one sees heavy influence from Mao and Sun Tzu, and the tactical material is
often adaptations of western military manuals or other standard works such
as Carlos Marighella’s Manual of the Urban Guerrilla rather than some sort
of new, uniquely Islamist thinking. Similarly, al-Muqrin recommends a fairly
standard hierarchical guerrilla organization rather than some fancy network
(not unexpectedly, since jihadists think of themselves as a movement, not a
network). Perhaps he did not know about networks or have the sophistication
to develop his own theory; or perhaps as we grow to know our enemies we will
realize they really are not ten feet tall.
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A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency
from the Civil War to Iraq
by Mark Moyar
Reviewed by Gregory A. Daddis, Academy Professor,
Department of History, US Military Academy

A

s the American commitment to South Vietnam grew
in the early 1960s, so too did the literature on
New Haven, Conn.:
counterinsurgency. In fact, so fashionable had the topic
Yale University
Press, 2009
become that military analyst Hanson W. Baldwin decried
368 pages
“the muddy verbosity and the pompous profundity that
$20.00
are beginning to mask the whole subject of counterinsurgency and guerrilla war.” Baldwin likely would not be
surprised by the similarly abundant musings on counterinsurgency in the last
five years. He might, however, have had his interest piqued by Mark Moyar’s
latest contribution, which maintains that leadership is at the heart of successful
counterinsurgencies. In fact, A Question of Command requires careful reading.
Moyar, the Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at the US
Marine Corps University, argues that the “leader-centric nature of counterinsurgency” demands identifying and developing commanders who are more
flexible, creative, and intellectually agile than their conventional counterparts.
Through nine historical case studies ranging from the American Civil War to
the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, Moyar’s aim is to isolate the leadership attributes of successful counterinsurgents. Indeed, he has ascertained ten
such attributes. Effective counterinsurgency leaders share the qualities of initiative (a major theme in this work), flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy,
charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization. Unfortunately,
Moyar offers little insight into how he identified these attributes, leaving the
reader to question his methodology for historical analysis.
The historical case studies form the bulk of A Question of Command,
and Moyar uses them not only to display the significance of leadership in unconventional warfare but also to critique “population-centric” and “enemy-centric”
theories of counterinsurgency. In the process, he attacks “doctrine or strategy
that dictates in detail how to defeat the insurgents.” Neither social, political,
and economic reforms nor using armed force to defeat insurgencies guarantee
success. Rather, Moyar argues, the leader who is able to adjust his methods to
local conditions is the most important factor. In the Civil War, as an example,
effective Union commanders labored to separate hostile civilians from friendly
and weighed the consequences before using armed force. (According to Moyar,
depopulation and forced resettlement, if done correctly, have benefits.) Poor
leaders allowed corruption to flourish in their commands while more capable
officers fixed bureaucratic weaknesses and replaced unprincipled commanders
who abused the local populace.
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In a refreshing addition to counterinsurgency literature, Moyar also
considers the Reconstruction era. As in the Civil War, Federal troops contended
with political ambiguities of an occupation mission and local elites who still
enjoyed the loyalty of Southern whites. Likewise, the Philippine Insurrection
demanded that US officers combat insurgent leaders from the Filipino upper
class (principalia), bolstering Moyar’s contention that counterinsurgencies
require subduing or destroying the enemy elite. The Philippines also reinforce a
major theme: destructive force selectively applied by good commanders is often
a necessary component of counterinsurgency warfare. As Moyar notes, the “US
response to the Philippine Insurrection contradicts the view . . . that civic action
is invariably more effective than military action in defeating insurgents.”
Ensuing case studies further Moyar’s defense of leadership as key
to counterinsurgency success. The Huk Rebellion in the post-World War II
Philippines illustrates the importance of host-nation leaders, in this instance,
Filipino Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay, stimulating effective
local resistance against insurgents. Moyar employs the Malayan Emergency to
show how civilian-military interagency committees could direct a war without
depriving local commanders of their freedom of action. Moyar’s balanced
chapter on the Vietnam War reveals the trials of counterinsurgency leaders
attempting to train local forces against an enemy able “to switch back and
forth between regular and irregular warfare.” Though claims of the “remarkable transformation of South Vietnamese leadership in the late 1960s and early
1970s” are unpersuasive, the Vietnam chapter demonstrates that leader development in host-nation forces is just as crucial as leader development within the
US armed forces.
Moyar reserves his final two studies for Afghanistan and Iraq. While
each conflict’s mosaic nature required (and still requires) sound leadership at
all levels, particularly the local, Moyar uses these chapters to renew his assault
on doctrinal fixations. “Afghanistan’s kaleidoscopic physical and human
landscapes,” he argues, “heightened the importance of adaptivity and further
reduced the value of doctrine.” In Iraq, the author rightly perceives more continuity between pre- and post-surge approaches to counterinsurgency than the
popular Operation Iraqi Freedom narrative indicates. As such, Moyar believes
the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual did not have as much impact as its
authors intended. The new manual even “impeded innovation to a degree by
advancing as universal certain principles and methods that were not actually
viable in all or even most counterinsurgency settings.”
Moyar’s fundamental argument makes sense. Leadership in war counts.
Yet as much as it offers a unique if simple approach to studying counterinsurgencies, A Question of Command proffers arguments that should be considered
with care. Moyar’s attack on doctrinal infatuation is fine; however, an army
founded on good doctrine does not necessarily make it doctrinaire. Whether
counterinsurgency requires a higher degree of resourcefulness than conventional operations seems equally tenuous. German and British innovations in
the World War I trenches or American tactical adjustments in the World War II
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Normandy hedgerows suggest that war, not just irregular war, requires all
armies to adapt to their enemy and surroundings. Finally, Moyar’s thinly veiled
backing of an aggressively interventionist foreign policy smacks of hubris.
Throughout this work, third-world leaders fighting insurgencies are portrayed
as inept and diffident administrators who only need American tutelage to be
successful counterinsurgents. Moyar concedes at the end, though, that such
“advice rarely sank in.”
A Question of Command is intended to assist counterinsurgents in Iraq
and Afghanistan and, on the whole, it should be read, but with a careful eye.
Moyar is surely correct that multifaceted wars require flexibility and creativity
from military and civilian leaders. If readers can navigate through this work’s
more specious supporting arguments, there is much to consider in developing
leaders comfortable with the complexities of modern war.

Courtesy of Harvard University Press

America’s Army: Making the
All-Volunteer Force
by Beth L. Bailey
Reviewed by Dr. Aaron O’Connell, Assistant Professor
of History, US Naval Academy.

B

eth Bailey has written a marvelous book about an
important topic. Her exploration of the Army’s tranCambridge, Mass.:
sition
from selective service to an all-volunteer force is
Harvard University
well-researched, persuasively argued, and clearly written
Press, 2009
in an easy style that is too often missing from both military
352 pages
and cultural history. From the draft protests of the 1960s
$29.95
to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s
Army narrates how the nation’s largest armed service survived the tumultuous
1970s, rebounded in the 1980s, and fashioned a winning formula for public
acceptance and support. While scholars have already given some treatment to
how the Army moved to an all-volunteer force, this book situates the transition
in the broader social context, using the debates over the Army’s future as a lens
into American race relations, gender relations, and the role of social science
research and the ideology of the market in military affairs.
Bailey begins in the Vietnam-soaked political landscape of the 1968
presidential campaign when candidate Richard Nixon first proposed abolishing
the draft. Nixon’s promise was pure political opportunism, but the actual work
of designing an all-volunteer force, which fell to a White House commission
of economists, soldiers, and business leaders, involved a deeper ideological
struggle. Should providing for the national defense be understood as an obligation of citizenship or a labor market issue of supply and demand? Prominent
free-market economists Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan believed the
latter and argued forcefully that the key was improved pay and benefits to
sustain the required enlistments. Other members of the commission, including
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retired Generals Alfred Gruenther and Lauris Norstad, had greater reservations
about the intrusion of market principles into military life. Despite the conflicts,
the free-marketers seized the initiative, and when President Nixon reported
the commission’s findings to Congress, he did so in decidedly Greenspanian
language. That ideology of the market, Bailey claims, has undergirded the
Army’s all-volunteer force ever since, and has led it to use marketing methods
with increasing sophistication: social-science data to identify target audiences,
marketing consultants to interpret that data, and Madison Avenue ad agencies to
sell the Army as everything from a path to college to a journey toward personal
fulfillment. While Bailey lauds the Army’s transition as a “tale of progress and
achievement,” she notes in the book’s last sentence that “there is something
lost when individual liberty is valued over all and the rights and benefits of
citizenship become less closely linked to its duties and obligations.”
The most enjoyable part of the chapters on the 1970s is the narration
of the Army’s dramatic branding failures. From its earliest, disastrous slogan,
“Today’s Army Wants to Join You,” to “Join the People Who’ve Joined the
Army,” and, on a recruiting postcard, “Nothing’s perfect, but this is pretty
good,” Bailey shows that the Army’s efforts to cater to “youth values” simply
did not work.
What saved the Army from its low point in the late 1970s was a new,
no-nonsense commanding general for recruiting and a new slogan. General
Maxwell R. “Mad Max” Thurman believed in more social-science data and
better use of it, and it was under him that the Army recruiting system finally
adopted modern corporate management. The nerdy and demanding Thurman
(Bailey describes him as “pencil-necked”) also spearheaded a change in the
corporate culture of the Army recruiting system, a shift to viewing the Army as
a “gigantic business” and recruiting as a “stock-control function” (Thurman’s
words). But the real hero of the Army’s rehabilitation was five little words that
Bailey argues changed the image of the Army in the 1980s: “Be All You Can
Be.” When the campaign began in 1980, only 54 percent of recruits had graduated from high school, and more than half were Category IVs, the lowest mental
category for enlistees. Seven years later, 91 percent were high school graduates
and only four percent were the dreaded “Cat IVs.” Later slogans, “Freedom
Isn’t Free,” “An Army of One,” and the current slogan, “Army Strong,” had
different emphases and varying degrees of success, but the Army’s path to an
all-volunteer force only became smoother in the 1990s and particularly after 11
September 2001.
Military historians have only recently begun considering military
public relations and recruiting history as windows into America’s civil-military
relations, so there is little to criticize in this path-breaking account. But this
reviewer cannot help but take issue with the conclusions Bailey draws on the
Army’s “turn to the market,” the increasing reliance on slick advertising, and
modern corporate management principles to keep its ranks filled. For as ads such
as “Army Strong,” “Creed,” and indeed, almost every Marine Corps recruiting slogan since the 1950s show, young Americans do not respond only to
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promises of economic gain and money for college. The ideology of the market
may now dominate the military’s methods but not their recruiting messages nor
their members’ motives. Strong beliefs in duty, martial tradition, and a desire
to sacrifice are principal reasons many enter the military. While Professor
Bailey does not directly suggest that military members are infected with the
free-market ideology she finds in the Army’s bureaucracy, one of the book’s
major claims is that in the transition to an all-volunteer force, the liberal-market
ideology of Friedman and Greenspan muscled out other, almost collectivist
notions of duty and citizenship. Those living and working in the armed forces
of the United States would not see it that way. And while this is a quibble over
emphasis rather than substance, it points the way for future work on how military members view their own culture and American society. Overall, America’s
Army is an excellent volume, appropriate for anyone interested in the military
and its role in American society.

Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the
National Security State
Courtesy of Penguin Press

by Garry Wills
Reviewed by John W. Coffey, retired Foreign Affairs
Officer at the US State Department.
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ecognizing that the world is a dangerous place,
Alexander Hamilton observed, “It is the nature of
New York: Penguin
war
to
increase the executive at the expense of the legisPress, 2010
lative authority.” Garry Wills views the evolution of the
278 pages
presidency in more sinister terms. According to Wills,
$27.95
the secret Manhattan Project provided a paradigm for
presidential usurpation of power across the spectrum of
national security. Wills’s determinism makes one thing explain everything. The
bomb knocked the Constitution off the skids. “Executive power,” the author
claims, “has basically been, since World War II, Bomb Power.” The “forces”
he describes have produced an “American monarch.”
Wills’s overwrought reprise of Arthur Schlesinger’s The Imperial
Presidency lacks three things: an appreciation of the differences between the
executive and legislative authorities; historical context; and recognition of the
importance of individuals in history. Let us trace his argument.
After World War II, a “structure of fear” in the executive office drove
a quest for atomic supremacy. For Wills, psychology displaces historical
context to explain foreign policymaking in response to a perceived Soviet
threat. The 1947 Truman Doctrine announcing aid to Greece and Turkey
formed a “main pillar” of the national security state. The National Security
Act of that year built the institutional structure (an Air Force, Department of
Defense, National Security Council, and Central Intelligence Agency). The
surreptitious diversion of Marshall Plan funds for covert operations to prevent
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a Communist victory in the 1948 Italian elections, NATO’s “militarization” of
the Marshall Plan, publication of NSC 68, and the establishment of the National
Security Agency completed the unconstitutional edifice. Executive prerogative
in secret CIA funding for covert operations fails to pass constitutional muster
for Wills, and the Manhattan Project’s secrecy served as precedent in subsequent years for covering up “anything important” and concealing CIA “crimes”
in its foreign interventions.
Despite congressional attempts in the 1970s (e.g., the War Powers
Resolution, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and congressionally
mandated CIA reforms) to limit executive power, the “imperial presidency”
remained unchecked, with Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld leading a
“counter-revolution” against the congressional coup when they returned to
power in the George W. Bush Administration. The Bush II Administration
launched an “extremist” assault on the War Powers Resolution (unconstitutional in the first place), and in a “crescendo of presidential arrogance” brought
executive usurpation to its climax. Wills might have indicted Richard Nixon,
instead of George W. Bush, as chief usurper. In that case, however, he would
have to concede that our constitutional system worked, having forced the resignation of a President under threat of impeachment. Wills also elides the fact
that America does have elections in which citizens have ample knowledge to
judge the propriety and efficacy of a President’s actions.
Wills ruefully concludes that President Obama has brought no real
change we can believe in. The modern President is “a self-entangling giant,”
an ensnared Gulliver, trapped in his insidious imperial power. The author
expresses forlorn hope for a return to “the quaint old Constitution” of congressional supremacy (Madison), though the eighteenth century lies far behind us.
Wills’s thesis about the modern presidency—after the bomb, therefore
because of the bomb—rests on a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The evolution of a powerful federal government and chief executive (and economic
chief) are due far more to presidential leadership in a Civil War, two World
Wars, and Great Depression than to one thing. Recently, we saw an unelected
executive body, the Federal Reserve Board, take extraordinary steps to avert a
second depression. Wills considers himself a Madisonian; yet the first significant expansion of executive power occurred with Jefferson’s extraconstitutional
Louisiana Purchase.
The 1830 Louisiana Purchase enlarged the area of the country about 140
percent, making the United States the second nation in total area and the first
nation in tillable area. Jefferson justified his greatest presidential achievement
by his concept of building an “empire of liberty” based on the law of nature
underlying national security, preservation. Jefferson used executive power to
protect free men from aggression and secure access to Mississippi commerce in
order to preserve and nurture the republic. Hamilton laid the politico-economic
foundations of modern America, but Jefferson acquired the territory making a
large commercial republic possible. Joseph Story, who disliked Jefferson and
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all his works, later ironically remarked that the strict-constructionist Jefferson
used the “implied powers” of the President championed by John Marshall.
Nor does Wills appreciate why the respective responsibility and composition of the executive and legislative authorities favor executive predominance
in national security affairs. Hamilton argued that because the common defense
is the first object of the Union, the power of defense must be constitutionally
unlimited on the principle that the means must be proportionate to the end:
“The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this
reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which
the care of it is committed.”
A due dependence on the people and due responsibility made a vigorous executive compatible with republican government, Hamilton maintained,
and “energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government.” Unlike the legislative branch, the Executive can act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” The virtues of the two authorities differ:
“In the legislative, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit.
The differences of opinion, and the jarring of parties . . . promote deliberation
and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority.” Dissension
enfeebles the executive, whereas “vigor and expedition” are required in the
conduct of war where the executive is the “bulwark of national security.”
According to constitutional scholar C. Herman Pritchett, judicial precedent
upholds the president’s primacy in foreign relations and war based on the grant
of executive power, authority as commander-in-chief, and recognized position
as “the nation’s organ for foreign affairs.” These powers, Pritchett held, are “so
great, in fact, that to a considerable degree they cancel out the most important
grant of external authority to Congress, the power to declare war.”
A preoccupation with one thing leads Wills to neglect the importance
of individuals in history, statesmen with different characters grappling, in concrete circumstances, with the complexities and uncertainties of policymaking
in a perilous world. In Arsenal of Democracy, Julian Zelizer details the fierce
partisan politics that shaped policy and party fortunes in the postwar era. Peter
Rodman’s fine Presidential Command describes the ebb and flow of executive authority in national security policymaking. Rodman explains why the
character of people, above all the commander-in-chief, is the paramount factor
in government, and he demonstrates how effective policymaking requires personal presidential engagement.
The Obama Administration has resisted congressional calls for wider
notification of covert actions, retained core elements of President Bush’s
counterterrorism policy, and dramatically increased drone strikes in Pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Furthermore, a bipartisan foreignpolicy consensus on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran has emerged between the
Administration and Republicans. These steps illustrate the permanence of our
interests (and how a party in, not out of, power must protect them) as well as
the interests of other nations. Only a strong President can represent the nation’s
unity of purpose and provide clarity of action in a world that looks for American
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leadership. That, not the bomb, is why we have a strong (not monarchical)
President.

A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard
Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon
Courtesy of Random House

by Neil Sheehan
Reviewed by Colonel Jeffrey L. Caton, USAF, Retired,
former Director of Research, Development, and
Acquisition Management and Defense Transformation
Chair, US Army War College.

A

family escapes a horrible war in their home country
and starts a new life in America. The father’s death
in a tragic industrial accident forces two young brothers
534 pages
to live in an orphanage. Through his mother’s determina$32.00
tion, as well as patronage from influential mentors, one
of the brothers rises to the military’s highest ranks, where he develops the most
devastating weapons ever known.
This is not fiction from Dickens, but rather the true story of General
Bernard Schriever told in compelling narrative by Neil Sheehan. An established expert on Vietnam, Sheehan had never heard of Schriever before he
started to research a book on the Cold War nuclear arms race. Captivated by the
incredible contributions made by this individual, he decided to make “Bennie”
the common thread of his work. He chose wisely, crafting a fresh historical
account that includes heroes and villains, courage and treachery, triumph and
tragedy, most of which occurred in a mere decade between “Mike,” the first
thermonuclear test in 1952, and the first operational alert of the “Minuteman”
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 1962.
Born 14 September 1910, in Bremen, Germany, Schriever’s first eight
years of life indeed included a family move to America, the untimely death of
his father, and residence in an orphanage until his mother found employment in
San Antonio, Texas. Luck and hard work brought the family back together, and
Bernard (“Bennie” for short) excelled in school and sports, eventually earning
his degree from Texas A&M. In 1932, he became an Army Air Corps pilot and
within a year reported to Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Hap” Arnold’s unit.
In the chapters covering the next 12 years, Sheehan presents professional
trends that would become Schriever’s hallmarks as a leader. By 1944, Schriever
became a young colonel after winning over the ill-tempered Brigadier General
“Ennis the Menace” Whitehead in Australia. After enduring unfair “chew out”
sessions from Whitehead, Bennie responded by applying his technical prowess
to solve persistent maintenance issues as well as by showing courage as a
B-17 bomber copilot. The author highlights the autumn of that year, when Hap
Arnold (now a five-star general) called Bennie to the Pentagon and entrusted
him to continue innovating the Air Corps as he himself had done before World
War II, and especially to aggressively embrace new technologies.
New York: Random
House, 2009
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Schriever spent most of the next nine years as a leader in the newly
formed US Air Force, trying to bolster the nuclear might of the Strategic Air
Command, but often drawing ire from General Curtis LeMay for sticking to
the facts instead of appeasing “the Cigar.” In 1952, when the United States
successfully tested the world’s first thermonuclear device, Schriever saw his
future venture revealed; Sheehan expertly chronicles the resulting paths Bennie
traveled to fulfill Arnold’s quest. First, he had to conquer the sheer physics of
building a small nuclear weapon, launching it thousands of miles, having it
survive a fiery reentry, and making it accurate enough to be of military utility.
Once such a capability was demonstrated, it had to be mass-produced, fielded,
tested, and declared operational—all in a race with the Soviet Union. And if
this was not enough, Schriever had to overcome the bureaucracy of getting any
program to survive approval from 42 agencies, let alone to become the nation’s
top defense priority. He excelled at building effective teams from brilliant, but
sometimes flawed, individuals and by focusing them toward a common vision.
Sheehan’s commentary of how Bennie’s teams tackled service rivalries, political intrigue, and a rapidly changing geopolitical environment offers a number
of positive examples for today’s leaders to consider.
Sheehan takes the reader through the winding path from the conception
of the ICBM to its eventual operational success as the Cold War’s ultimate
weapon. He demonstrates admirable skill for simplifying complex scientific
details and engaging the reader with vignettes about the personalities surrounding the events. The final sections of the book extend the story into space when
Schriever is tasked to use ICBM rockets to boost America’s first photographic
reconnaissance satellites into orbit. In a way, this brings the saga full circle;
such space-based intelligence was used by the United States and Soviet Union
to add stability to deterrence.
A Fiery Peace in a Cold War puts a human face on the global struggle
for nuclear superiority. Fortunately for readers, the author adds new depth and
details from his 52 interviews with General Schriever, as well as from dialogue
with over 118 others who knew the general well. He brings to life such men as
Trevor Gardner, the work-hard, play-hard Welshman who navigated the oftentreacherous waters of Washington, DC; General LeMay, the mercurial nemesis
who considered ICBM development as an “extravagant boondoggle” siphoning
funds away from his precious nuclear bombers; Lieutenant Colonel Ed Hall, the
caustic genius who designed the Atlas liquid rockets as well as the solid-fueled
Minuteman; and Colonel “Moose” Mathison, who built rocket pads in swamps
and perfected the art of plucking a satellite’s film from the sky. These and many
more such characters bring insight and empathy to this tale of two cities—in
this case, Washington and Moscow.
Perhaps the only shortcoming of the book is that it gives the impression
that all is well with Schriever’s legacy. Indeed, Sheehan ends with the thought
that Bennie may be smiling on what he accomplished, but one might wonder
how he would reflect on our military’s recent string of careless events that
endanger the stewardship of US nuclear weapons—and by logical extension,

Spring 2011

167

Book Reviews

the safety of the world. Without having to call upon Jacob Marley, perhaps
reading Sheehan’s account can cast General Schriever as the “ghost of missiles
past” to visit today’s leaders and help ensure that his dream does not become
their nightmare.

The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds,
and Souls of Our Soldiers
Courtesy of W. W. Norton & Co.

by Nancy Sherman
Reviewed by Chaplain (Colonel) David Reese,
Director, Ethical Development, US Army War College
and former Director of Soldier and Family Ministries,
Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

S

ince the introduction of Dr. Jonathan Shay’s Achilles
in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing
of Character, there have been a handful of books that
248 pages
examine modern soldiers and combat through the lens of
$27.95
ancient Greek tales of iconic warriors such as Achilles,
Odysseus, and Ajax. Dr. Nancy Sherman’s The Untold
War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers expertly elevates the
examination with the complementary pairing of ancient Greek philosophy and
modern psychology. This book fulfills its promise of revealing what Sherman
describes as “the moral weight of war that individual soldiers carry on their
shoulders and don’t usually talk about.” It is an unflinching look beyond the
veil of modern warriors who try to reconstruct their ideals and their lives. The
book is a worthy read by senior leaders interested in the “inner war and its
subtle moral contours,” and those who desire a better understanding of the
impact of the prolonged war on terror.
Dr. Sherman is a distinguished professor of philosophy at Georgetown
University. Associated with the military since 1995, she frequently advises the
Department of Defense on issues of ethics, resilience, and posttraumatic stress.
She served as the first Distinguished Chair in Ethics at the US Naval Academy
and laid the groundwork for the institution’s Stockdale Center for Ethical
Leadership. During this period, serving routinely alongside soldier-scholars,
she developed an interest in the relationship between the ancient Stoic philosophies and contemporary warriors. The Untold War follows on the heels of her
previous book, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy behind the Military
Mind, and delves even deeper into the individual stories of soldiers as they
experience war and its aftermath. Sherman relies on her background in Stoic
philosophy, accompanied by her training in psychoanalysis, to unveil the existential tension that lies buried in the heart of those soldiers. In this intellectually
stimulating treatise she examines the private burdens of the soldier’s life and
the resultant “residue of war.”
Although similar in premise to works by Dr. Shay, she adds a distinctly
personal dimension to the story. While Shay primarily uses the broad brush of
New York:
W. W. Norton and
Company, 2010
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psychiatry to interpret soldier narratives revealed through classic Greek texts
such as The Iliad and The Odyssey, Sherman paints a portrait of warriors with
the colors of philosophy. Her canvas is Stoicism, the ancient Roman philosophy marked by a distinct decorum and management of emotions. The Untold
War adroitly fills in the details with the fine brush of personal narrative drawn
from more than 40 personal conversations with veterans of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. This distinction thoroughly engages the reader mentally and
emotionally.
The author’s portrait of soldiers’ attempts to reconstruct their moral and
psychological world is rife with the pain associated with both physical trauma
and the invisible psychological trauma of war. In a culminating narrative, the
author painfully shares the story of Colonel Ted Westhusing, a colleague at
West Point. Westhusing was a professor of English and philosophy when he
volunteered to deploy to Iraq in January 2005. Six months later, he apparently
took his life when “his moral idealism collided with the reality of the war in
Iraq and the corruption of contractors whom it was his job to oversee.” In his
suicide note, Westhusing appealed to the self-sufficiency of virtue reflected in
the philosophy he taught. “I came to serve honorably,” he wrote, “and [I] feel
dishonored . . . . Death before being dishonored anymore.” Sherman reports
that Westhusing “felt sullied, and in a tradition that Stoics made famous he took
his life to preserve his honor.”
Sherman’s portrayal of soldiers’ struggles against the backdrop of the
Stoic philosophy of Aristotle, Epictetus, and Seneca is captivating. From the
guilt-ridden commander, Major John Prior, who lost a soldier to a horrific, yet
accidental fratricide, to the starkly analytic approach of Captain Ray Longworth,
a retired counterintelligence officer whose liaison duties often placed him at
the scene of questionable interrogation activities, the reader is given literary
permission to accompany Sherman in her interviews. The author also draws on
recollections from soldiers in both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, lending
even more weight to the thesis that the challenges of war to one’s moral and
emotional health remain unchanged.
Sherman’s latest addition to the body of literature is well-researched,
well-written, and helpful. What is most impressive is her gentle handling of
the veterans’ stories alongside the dialogue about Stoicism. She advocates for
a “gentle Stoicism” that retains the necessary insulation from those aspects of
war that are beyond one’s control, yet is permeable enough to allow adequate
reconstruction of the human soul and psyche following war. Coupled with her
previous book, Stoic Warrior, this new exploration of gentle Stoicism will be
an excellent addition to the required reading lists for both intermediate and
senior-level professional military education.
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Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the
American Constitution
Courtesy of Random House

by Richard Beeman
.

Reviewed by Colonel Alan Cate, USA, Retired

B

y the mid-1780s, many Americans believed the newly
independent United States was dangerously adrift.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the loose form of
New York, NY:
national government adopted during the Revolution, the
Random House,
2009
country seemed powerless to confront its enormous problems. Mired in depression, and experiencing a serious
514 pages
currency drain and rampant inflation, the Confederation
$18.00
Congress in New York could regulate neither trade nor
money. Nor could it levy taxes. Unable to honor the recent peace treaty with
Britain by paying off pre-war debts, the nation suffered the humiliation of redcoats refusing to vacate posts on American soil. The lack of funds, along with
republican fears of a standing army, meant no troops were available to contest
these acts.
One nationalist declared to George Washington, retired at Mount Vernon,
that this situation represented “a crisis worse than the war.” The old hero replied
that Americans “probably had too good an opinion of human nature” in forming
the confederation and that the country needed a stronger national government
with more “coercive power.” Writing to another correspondent Washington
plaintively asked, “Have we fought for this?”
This “crisis of the 1780s” furnishes the backdrop to Plain, Honest
Men, Richard Beeman’s marvelous account of the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, where from late May to mid-September “a small group of men . . .
convinced that America’s experiment in republican liberty was in jeopardy”
took bold action to reboot the country.
Thomas Jefferson—he wasn’t there; he was in Paris on a diplomatic
mission—later called this gathering an “assemblage of demigods” and the best
known popular history of the Convention is titled Miracle at Philadelphia,
but there was nothing godlike or miraculous about what transpired. Rather,
what Beeman, a distinguished scholar of early America at the University of
Pennsylvania, demonstrates here is that truth can be more fascinating than—
and just as inspiring as—mythology.
Beeman reminds us that the past is a foreign country. In the late eighteenth century, “intellectualism and political activism could naturally, easily
coexist.” The framers were “both the intellectual and political leaders of
their respective states,” and were equally at home in the realms of theory and
practice. Beeman limns a striking collective picture. There were 55 accredited
delegates from 12 states; Rhode Island didn’t bother to send anyone and New
Hampshire’s representatives had to pay their own way. Not all were present
for the entire four-month Convention; some arrived late, while others checked
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out early because of disenchantment or more pressing business back home.
Only the most persistent, patient, and flexible stayed at it. Thirty-nine of the
42 men present on the final day signed the document. Eight of the 55 had also
signed the Declaration of Independence. Thirty saw active service during the
War of Independence. Fully 42 of them had served in or were current members
of Congress. Twenty-five owned slaves. Two would become President. Two
would be killed in duels.
The individual portraits are sharply drawn. For Beeman, the three
“indispensable men” were a soldier, a scholar, and a sage: Washington, James
Madison, and Benjamin Franklin. None would dispute the centrality of the first
two. The “Father of our Country” presided over the Convention and, although
he remained virtually silent throughout, his mere presence lent vital “prestige
and gravitas” to the proceedings. The “Father of the Constitution” supplied
the “intellectual firepower . . . that animated the Convention.” On the other
hand, many historians might demur at the significance Beeman attributes to
Franklin, who at 81 was by far the oldest delegate. Even Beeman concedes
that his contributions to debate were occasionally “off the point, even a little
bizarre.” Still, he convincingly argues that Franklin embodied “the spirit of
compromise necessary if the thirteen independent states were to come together
in an effective and durable union.”
Beeman’s depictions of the second tier participants are equally arresting. Most notable among them were Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth and Roger
Sherman, South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney, and Massachusetts’s Elbridge
Gerry. The first two repeatedly steered their frequently fractious colleagues
toward compromise. Pinckney was instrumental in ensuring that important
protections for slavery wound up in the Constitution. And Gerry, “the most
consistent naysayer at the Convention,” ultimately refused to sign the final
document.
That document “remains a model of concision.” The original handwritten version numbered just four pages; its 27 amendments if similarly written
out would lengthen it to only seven pages. By way of contrast, the European
Union’s constitution is currently at more than 850 pages and counting. And
compared to other written charters the framers’ handiwork has endured, in
contrast, say, to the old joke about where in the library one finds a copy of the
French Constitution: “periodicals.”
A day-by-day account of the legislative wrangling that produced the
Constitution may not sound like compelling reading, but Beeman transmits a
palpable sense of the drama played out in Philadelphia over a long, hot summer.
As much work was done in the city’s taverns and coffee houses as in the actual
meeting venue. Beeman phrases it nicely; these were men who “appreciated the
benefits of lubricious conviviality.” Dozens of issues, great and trivial, had to
be resolved. The most contentious was whether to grant equal or proportional
representation, based upon population, to each of the states in the national legislature. Our bicameral Congress represents the compromise solution. Curiously
enough, for all the bickering over this topic, a large-small state divide has never
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been an issue in our politics. On the other hand, sectionalism—specifically a
north-south split over slavery—subsequently poisoned the country.
More than previous works on the making of the Constitution, Beeman
analyzes the framers and slavery, “the paradox at the nation’s core.” His discussion is thorough and sensitive. The framers’ disagreements over slavery
centered not on morality, but on questions of property rights, and the distribution of power between north and south. He sadly, but judiciously, concludes
that there were “no moral heroes” on this issue and that our Founding Fathers
were “prisoners of the prevailing economic forces and social attitudes of their
time.”
Beeman tells an old story well and in a way that suggests valuable
lessons for our own time. The framers were accomplished and opinionated
men, yet they largely succeeded in “checking their egos” at the door. They
could be highly partisan and often disagreed vehemently, yet their disputes
never degenerated into the rageaholic behavior that lately has become distressingly common in our politics. And those today who insist on sticking to the
framers’ “original intent” might reflect on how frequently they were divided
over and tentative about the precise meaning of many of the Constitution’s
parts. Yet, while not achieving perfection, they did indeed move in the direction
of “a more perfect union” and Beeman is correct to conclude that their legacy
remains an “extraordinary accomplishment.”

Dogface Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K.
Truscott, Jr.
Courtesy of Random House

by Wilson A. Heefner
Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, USA, Retired

I

n considering the value of service rendered by the
senior officers in the European and Mediterranean theaters
of operations during World War II, General Dwight
Columbia, MO:
University of
D. Eisenhower ranked Lieutenant General Lucian K.
Missouri Press, 2010
Truscott, Jr. second only to George S. Patton, Jr. as an
392 pages
army commander. Army chief of staff General George
$34.95
C. Marshall also gave Truscott exemplary remarks as an
able fighter in the Mediterranean, citing Truscott’s “flair
for bold and decisive action.” Surprisingly, no definitive biography of this
remarkable soldier exists in the sixty-five years since the war ended. In Dogface
Soldier: The Life of General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Wilson A. Heefner corrects
this imbalance.
Heefner, a retired physician, spent forty-one years in the Army as an
enlisted soldier, infantry officer, and medical officer in the Regular Army,
Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve. He is no stranger to military
biography, having written Twentieth Century Warrior: The Life and Service of
Major General Edwin D. Patrick and Patton’s Bulldog: The Life and Service
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of General Walton H. Walker. Dogface Soldier is Heefner’s most ambitious
project to date.
In writing Dogface Soldier, Heefner draws heavily on Truscott’s two
autobiographical memoirs, Command Missions: A Personal Story and The
Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry: Life in the Old Army, 1917-1942. Heefner supplements his research with a plethora of archival sources consisting of private
collections, personal interviews, and published and unpublished sources. The
net result is the most authoritative biography of Truscott yet written. Of special
interest to Paramters’ readers will be Truscott’s post-World War II career
during which he served as military governor of Bavaria and as a senior Central
Intelligence Agency representative in West Germany and later as CIA Director
Allen Dulles’s deputy for coordination in Washington, DC.
Heefner’s Truscott emerges from the pages as the consummate battlefield commander, who demonstrated an ability “to think like” the unit that he
commanded. A product of the first Officers’ Training Camp conducted during
World War I, Truscott selected cavalry as his branch of service. On duty with
the 17th Cavalry Regiment, Truscott saw active service on the Mexican border
before his unit deployed to Hawaii in 1918. Aside from actively participating
in the polo matches that had long been popular in the islands, Truscott’s overall
service as a junior officer was undistinguished. Returning to the mainland in
1921, Truscott took full advantage of the interwar army’s emphasis on institutionalized professional education, graduating from the Command and General
Staff School and the US Army War College with an admirable academic record.
Despite his personal preferences to the contrary, Truscott reluctantly
accepted assignment to the War Department’s General Staff for duty with the
IX Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1941. There, Truscott came in contact
with Eisenhower and Brigadier General Mark Clark, two officers who would
play a significant role in Truscott’s future advancement. When war began in
December 1941, Clark, now chief of staff of the Army Ground Forces, summoned Truscott to Washington. Truscott’s mission was to join a select group of
officers to join the staff of Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander
in chief of the Combined Operations Headquarters responsible for the British
Commandos and for British amphibious training. It was the beginning of what
Truscott described laconically as “four eventful years.”
Truscott’s exemplary record during those years needs little recounting here. His service with Mountbatten led to the formation of the American
Rangers. During Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa, Truscott
commanded a regimental combat team as part of Patton’s Western Task Force.
Personally selected by Ike to establish an advance command post to coordinate
future operations, Truscott performed brilliantly, leading to his assignment as
commanding general of the 3d Infantry Division on 3 March 1943. His stock
had risen in Eisenhower’s eyes on the invasion of Sicily to the point that Ike
characterized the 3d Division as “the best unit we have over here. The men
are tough, enthusiastic, well disciplined . . . Truscott is the quiet, forceful,
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enthusiastic type that subordinates instinctively follow . . . and his relations
with his opposite number in the Navy are the best.”
In Sicily, Truscott mastered the art of amphibious operations and the
division’s soldiers advanced farther than any other Allied unit due in no small
part to Truscott’s emphasis on physical training and extended field marching,
the so-called “Truscott Trot.” Combat in Italy as part of Clark’s Fifth Army
added to Truscott’s battlefield laurels. Small wonder that Clark tapped Truscott
on 22 February 1944 to succeed VI Corps commander Major General John
Lucas, who was relieved without prejudice in the aftermath of the Anzio
landing. Immediately, Truscott visited the forward elements, revamped the
artillery fire support plan, and restored the fighting spirit of VI Corps. Within
weeks, Truscott stabilized the front and led the corps in a massive counterattack
that, along with Clark’s advance up the peninsula, led to the capture of Rome
in early June.
Truscott’s service in the Mediterranean theater was not finished. In
August, he commanded a three-divisional assault force as part of Operation
ANVIL, the invasion of southern France on 15 August 1944. When Clark
was elevated to command 15th Army Group in November 1944, Army chief
Marshall nominated Truscott to succeed Clark in command of Fifth Army.
Returning to Italy, Truscott led Fifth Army with characteristic distinction until
the Nazis capitulated in May 1945. By war’s end, Truscott was the only officer
in the American Army who had commanded a regimental combat team, an
infantry division, a corps, and a field army over the course of the conflict.
Truscott’s most moving tribute to the dogface soldiers whom he had
led in combat occurred on Memorial Day, 1945, when he motored to Anzio
to deliver the Memorial Day address at the temporary cemetery serving as the
resting place for roughly twenty thousand men killed in the fighting during
the Italian command. Turning his back on the assembly of senior politicians
and officers, Truscott addressed not the guests but the graves, apologizing to
the dead for their presence in the cemetery. Bill Mauldin described it as “the
most moving gesture I ever saw. It came from a hard-boiled old man who was
incapable of planned dramatics.” It was, however, vintage Truscott.
To his credit, Heefner also addresses the more controversial aspects of
Truscott’s career, including allegations of excessive drinking. One detractor
characterized Truscott as “an ill-tempered Texan, who was steeped in self righteousness” and who owed his professional advancement to his close association
with Eisenhower and Clark. Far more serious was Truscott’s seemingly unwillingness to hold General Ned Almond, an avowed racist who commanded the
largely African-American 92d Infantry Division, accountable for the division’s
poor performance. Here Heefner interjects his personal belief that Truscott’s
comments about the unreliability of the black infantry elements of the 92d ID
did not reflect Truscott’s personal racial bias, but rather the accepted “racial
mindset” that characterized the US Army of World War II.
On the debit side, Dogface Soldier contains excessive military terminology and the maps are of mixed quality. More suited for avid military historian
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than the general public, Dogface Soldier nevertheless fills an important gap
in military historiography. These observations aside, Heefner has produced a
comprehensive biography of a soldier arguably considered as one of America’s
most highly-rated battlefield commanders in World War II. We remain in
Truscott’s debt for his distinguished service during the century’s bloodiest conflict. We are in Heefner’s debt for introducing “this great soldier and patriot to
a new generation of military historians.”

The Stress Effect: Why Smart Leaders Make
Dumb Decisions—And What to Do About It
by Henry L. Thompson
Courtesy of Jossey-Bass

Reviewed by Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA, Retired,
Assistant Professor of Cultural Sciences, US Army War
College

T

here are several recent books and articles that explore
leader failures, often attributing to them bad behavior, character flaw, or dysfunction. The Stress Effect offers
329 pages
a different approach and perspective that may be useful to
$26.95
leaders and managers across several domains.
The author has impressive credentials garnered
from three careers, which provide a unique perspective on the topic of leader
decisionmaking ability. Dr. Thompson began as a military officer whose experiences extend from Vietnam to assignments in the Center for Army Leadership,
then as a university professor and psychology department chairperson, and now
as a leadership consultant with his own firm.
The book is intended for those interested in leader development and
organizational dynamics. Some chapters will be more comfortable for readers
with backgrounds in industrial and organizational psychology or organizational behavior. Leadership practitioners will be tempted to jump right to the
latter chapter, “The Seven Best Practices to Prevent Stress”—that would be
a mistake. That chapter is an integration of a number of best practices introduced in several other books so nothing new is presented. The uniqueness is
the use of the acronym ARSENAL to frame the practices—Awareness, Rest,
Support, Exercise, Nutrition, Attitude, Learning. However, to appreciate how
this framework may be useful, all readers should expend the requisite effort
with the earlier chapters.
As befitting an academic, Thompson provides a primer on several
high-level constructs presented in this book. He includes a literature review of
the seminal theories of psychology combined with research findings on how
individuals process information (perception and assessment), what drives them
(motivation), and how they use the information to achieve goals (action).
The material in the early chapters will be familiar to former faculty of
at least two senior level colleges. Most of our strategic leadership curriculum is
based on the work of Elliott Jaques’s Stratified Systems Theory and the research
San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 2010
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of T. Owens Jacobs with students of the National Defense University (Industrial
College of the Armed Forces). Thompson provides a spate of vignettes and
anecdotes to illustrate the concepts across levels of direct, organizational,
and strategic leadership. Military members will embrace the stories about
Ranger and Airborne qualification courses. Business leaders will identify with
examples of individuals in organizational settings. Most readers will nod their
heads as the author builds the case for the effects of cognition and emotion on
decision- making under “normal” conditions and under stress. The book is a
marriage of ideas and brings to mind the old adage, “Something old, something
new, something borrowed, something blue.”
“Something old” is the long-debated question of whether leaders are
born or made and the search for the specific traits of “good leaders.” The most
innate attribute of individuals is cognitive intelligence. The author cites several
studies that establish senior leaders (CEOs, general officers, elected public
officials, etc.) generally have above average intelligence as measured by the
traditional intelligence quotient. The consistent theme is that proper selection
of potential leaders begins with identifying those who have the requisite intelligence to do well in complex situations that require judgment.
“Something new” is the recent contributions from neuroscience as it
applies to cognition and decisionmaking, particularly for leaders. The author
effectively explains the regions of the brain that are functionally related to
primal responses, emotions, and higher-order thinking. This exploration helps
the reader to understand the physiological and biochemical processes of thinking and decisionmaking.
“Something borrowed” is the concept of interpersonal competencies
and the re-emergence of emotional intelligence as a key competency for leaders.
While emotional intelligence as presented by Dan Goleman has gotten a lot of
attention in the past decade, the foundational concept has been around since the
mid-1960s. This is an important competency if one accepts that leadership is
the process of influencing others. In order to influence, leaders have to possess
self-awareness and be able to relate to the feelings of those who may choose to
partner or follow.
“Something blue” is the discouraging aspect of leadership in the
modern era marked by complexity and ambiguity that make leading organizations an inherently stress-filled endeavor. The conjecture is made that smart
leaders generally make dumb mistakes based on the stresses that are part and
parcel of organizational life. Rather than focus on traits or the character of the
individual, Thompson presents evidence that leaders are limited by their innate
cognitive abilities and have shortcomings in emotional intelligence necessary
to assess pertinent information, to render appropriate judgments, and then make
effective decisions.
As the title suggests, stress degrades the quality of decisions made by
leaders and so the author offers that developing resilience is the inoculation that
leaders require. Developing stress resilience has three components: increasing
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stress management capacity, cognitive resilience, and stress resilient emotional
intelligence.
The Stress Effect is a timely offering that complements the efforts the US
Army has placed on resiliency over the past year. This era of persistent conflict
has had an accompanying rise in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and suicides at
the level of individual soldiers. At the operational and strategic levels, military
professionals are being challenged on the quality of their strategic thinking and
decisionmaking. I do not expect that this book will solve all our problems, but
it may provide a greater understanding of how to define and approach problems
that leaders face in this new century. This book will serve as a handy reference
to mid-grade and senior leaders with practical techniques for their personal
self-development as well as for members of organizations they lead.
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